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In Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating
Counties' Role in the Death Penalty,' Professor Adam Gershowitz
presents an interesting proposal to transfer from localities to states
the power to enforce the death penalty. In his view, state-level
enforcement would result in a more rationally applied death penalty
because states are better able than localities to bear the high cost of
prosecuting capital cases. As a consequence, states would be much
more likely to make capital charging decisions based on desert,
without the distorting influence of the severe resource constraints
applicable to all but the wealthiest of localities. If enforced at the state
level through mechanisms designed to ensure that a state's most
qualified personnel will serve as prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges in capital cases, he contends, the death penalty can be enforced
more rationally and evenhandedly statewide.
There is much to commend in Professor Gershowitz's proposal.
He wisely resists the inclination to dress up his arguments for
sweeping change in constitutional garb, admitting that his proposals
are not constitutionally mandated but offered up for legislative
consideration. To a degree that is rare for legal scholarship today, he
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. For helpful comments and suggestions, I
am indebted to Darryl Brown, Nicole Garnett, Rick Garnett, Adam Gershowitz, and Carter
Snead.
1. 63 VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010).
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carefully spells out precisely how the state-level enforcement scheme
he advocates should be structured and implemented. Moreover, unlike
the usual complaints about the high cost of capital punishment-
which seek only to make executions cheaper and more expeditious, no
matter the impact on the accuracy and reliability of the process by
which the law decrees death 2 -his proposals are designed to improve
the enforcement of the death penalty.
As well conceived as Professor Gershowitz's proposal is,
however, I remain skeptical that statewide enforcement of the death
penalty would be preferable to continued local enforcement. First,
Professor Gershowitz underestimates the benefits of localism in the
death penalty. Localism, properly viewed, is not entirely negative and
may actually be quite positive. Second, and more fundamentally, there
is every reason to believe the "politics of death" 3 would operate, at the
state level, to defeat the salutary purposes of Professor Gershowitz's
reforms. Thus, as intriguing as it is, the prospect of statewide
enforcement holds little promise as a means of rationalizing the
administration of the death penalty.
I. So WHAT IF LOCALISM LEADS TO DISPARATE ENFORCEMENT?
According to Professor Gershowitz, the high cost of capital
punishment is troubling because, in effect, it leads to
underenforcement of the death penalty in most localities in "death"
states. In all but the largest and wealthiest counties, killers who
deserve to be put to death all too often escape the ultimate sanction,
while similarly situated suspects who committed murder in the few
counties that can afford capital prosecutions face the death penalty.
He regards this pattern of disparate enforcement in different localities
as an intolerable form of arbitrariness.4
2. See, e.g., Matt Thacker, Clark County Prosecutor Supports Limits on Death-Penalty
Payments, NEWS & TRIB. (Ind.), Dec. 18, 2010, http://newsandtribune.com/local/x1666507751/
Clark-County-prosecutor-supports-limits-on-death-penalty-payments (citing prosecutor's claim
that the death penalty is so expensive to enforce because "defendants are allowed to spend an
exorbitant amount of money for attorney fees, experts and other expenses").
3. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283
(2008).
4. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 318-23 (discussing county-to-county variation in death
penalty enforcement and providing examples of counties that have declined to seek the death
penalty for budgetary reasons). Although Professor Gershowitz focuses on the underenforcement
of the death penalty in counties that rarely or never seek death sentences, the phenomenon may
be even broader than he supposes. Even the wealthier counties that do enforce the death penalty
do not have unlimited resources, and so the high cost of the death penalty likely causes them,
like other counties, to limit their use of the death penalty. In that case, the death penalty is
being underutilized statewide, not just in smaller, less affluent counties.
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In my view, these kinds of disparities are not troubling at all,
but rather the inevitable effect of any system of nationally varying law
enforcement. Geography-meaning whether crimes are committed in
one place or another-routinely determines the treatment that
otherwise similarly situated offenders receive. Not only do laws and
penalties frequently differ across jurisdictions, but so do resources,
enforcement priorities, and prosecutorial and sentencing policies.
These differences frequently have outcome- determinative effects.
Crimes that, in one place, might not even result in charges may end in
arrest and prosecution if committed elsewhere, and even serious
crimes might be graded or punished very differently in different
jurisdictions. There is nothing unique, or uniquely troubling, about
the death penalty in this regard.
Professor Gershowitz implies that such differences are only
acceptable when different sovereigns are involved. In his view, it is
permissible to give different sentences to two similarly situated
offenders guilty of first-degree murder if one of the states involved
lacks the death penalty, but not if the murders took place in different
counties within a state that allows capital punishment.5 Although
Professor Gershowitz is right that sovereignty considerations can
justify differential treatment of similarly situated offenders, it does
not follow that differential treatment within a single sovereign is
suspect, let alone unjustified. Moreover, if uniformity is required
within a single sovereign, as he implies, then all of criminal law-not
just the death penalty-is riddled with the geographic arbitrariness of
which he complains, and he should be advocating statewide
enforcement of all criminal laws instead of just crimes punishable by
death.
Certainly, there is nothing in Furman v. Georgia6 and its
progeny suggesting that death should be treated as "different" in this
regard. To be sure, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires
legislatures to enact standards of "death eligibility" that will serve
both to narrow the class of offenders who are subject to capital
punishment and to channel the jury's discretion in making the
life/death decision.7 The law, however, does not require prosecutors to
5. See id. at 312-13 (arguing that federalism concerns justify variation between states but
not county-to-county variation within states).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
7. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
361-71 (1995) (examining the Supreme Court's regulation of capital punishment beginning with
Furman and distilling the Court's concerns to four themes: desert, fairness, individualization,
and heightened procedural reliability).
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seek, or jurors to impose, the death penalty in every instance where
legislatively prescribed standards of death eligibility are satisfied.
Indeed, in the case of capital sentencers, the Supreme Court has held
precisely the opposite-that jurors can never be required to impose
death and must always have unfettered discretion to grant leniency
(and, in effect, nullify legislative standards of death eligibility).8
Needless to say, the potential for disparate results is necessarily
implicit in the mandate that capital sentencers must have broad
discretion to show mercy, insofar as different juries, presented with
similarly situated offenders, might grant mercy to some but not
others.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that broad prosecutorial
discretion in capital charging decisions-and the resulting possibility
that such charging decisions will vary from prosecutor to prosecutor-
is consistent with Furman. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court dismissed a
claim that Furman requires statewide consistency in capital charging
decisions as "nothing more than a veiled contention that Furman
indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally unrealistic
conditions on its use."9 In so holding, Gregg was clear that the
arbitrariness Furman condemned was arbitrariness in sentencing, not
routine exercises of prosecutorial discretion. 10 Absent a sufficient
showing of unconstitutional discrimination, a defendant properly
condemned to die under a valid capital sentencing scheme "cannot
prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other
defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death
8. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (holding that the sentencer
may not refuse to consider "any relevant mitigating evidence"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976) (holding mandatory imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional
because it prevents juries from granting mercy). As I have explained elsewhere: "Under Eighth
Amendment case law, the fact finder is far more than simply a balancer of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Its most important function, perhaps, is to serve as a dispenser of
mercy-in the case of juries, to bring the mores of the community to bear on whether to spare the
life of a defendant whom the law deems 'death-eligible.' " Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland
Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 525 (2009).
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 224-
26 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (joining the plurality in rejecting a claim that charging
discretion is unconstitutional because it "will inexorably result in the wanton and freakish
imposition of the penalty condemned by the judgment in Furman").
10. As the plurality in Gregg explained: "Furman held only that, in order to minimize the
risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the
decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus
on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant." Id. at 199 (plurality
opinion). Of course, as McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), recognizes, discrimination in
capital charging decisions is a concern of the Equal Protection Clause, but selective enforcement
is not the kind of arbitrariness with which Statewide Capital Punishment is concerned.
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penalty."" There would, therefore, appear to be no reason in principle
why the localism that prevails in all other aspects of American
criminal law should be treated as problematic in the context of
offenses punishable by death.
II. THE BENEFITS OF LOCALISM IN THE DEATH PENALTY
As the discussion so far suggests, Professor Gershowitz treats
localism in the death penalty as a decidedly negative phenomenon. In
light of the high cost of enforcing the death penalty, 12 he argues that
localism has resulted (and necessarily results) in unjustified disparity
in the enforcement of a sanction that should be uniformly applied
throughout every "death" state. The few counties with the resources to
do so enforce the death penalty, but the majority of counties do not,
resulting in an "under-utilization of the death penalty" that Professor
Gershowitz describes as "troubling."13
11. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07 (citing Gregg). In light of the limitations of existing
Eighth Amendment law, Professor Gershowitz wisely makes no claim that localism in the
enforcement of the death penalty is unconstitutional, instead urging states, as a matter of
legislative choice, to enact his proposed mechanism of statewide enforcement.
12. According to some estimates, each death sentence can cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars or more to obtain and several million dollars to defend and carry out years later. One
study claims that the average total cost per execution in the United States ranges from two to
three million dollars. See Smith, supra note 3, at 339 n. 198 (citing study). In federal death
penalty trials, defense costs alone averaged $620,000 from 1998-2004, with a high of almost $1.8
million. JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES:
UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
CASES 24-25, 25 tbl.2 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
AppointmentOfCounsel/Viewer.aspxdoc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/FDPC
2010.pdf&page=1. As death penalty opponents are quick to point out, even these high cost
figures may be significantly understated because they do not include a variety of other pertinent
costs, such as the costs incurred in cases where death sentences are sought but not imposed, the
cost of retrials in cases where death sentences are reversed (as most are at some point), and
higher incarceration costs for prisoners on death row. See, e.g., RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE DEATH PENALTY IN A TIME OF
ECONOMIC CRISIS 14-18 (2009), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf (claiming that the total cost to taxpayers for each execution may
be as high as $30 million).
13. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 309-10 (citing Texas as an example of widespread
underenforcement of the death penalty in most counties). In fairness to Professor Gershowitz, his
concern is not with increasing the use of the death penalty per se. His concern, rather, is having
the death penalty enforced uniformly statewide, and underenforcement of the death penalty in
most localities, combined with possible overenforcement in wealthy counties, is troublesome to
him because it suggests an arbitrary lack of uniformity in capital charging decisions.
Nevertheless, given his account of the limiting effect of local resource constraints on the
enforcement of the death penalty, uniform enforcement of the death penalty by states without
reference to cost would almost certainly result in greater (perhaps even significantly greater) use
of the death penalty.
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However appealing this line of reasoning might be to those who
believe the death penalty is underenforced-and many do14-the
relevant point here is that this critique of local disparities in capital
charging decisions rests on an unsupported empirical premise. The
premise is that resource disparities among localities explain why only
the largest and wealthiest counties typically enforce the death penalty
with any regularity.
Although it is likely that the high cost of capital trials has
something to do with this phenomenon, there is no reason to think
that only differences in local resources are at work here. It might be,
for example, that greater population and higher murder rates (real or
perceived) account for much of the greater use of the death penalty by
larger, wealthier counties. To his credit, Professor Gershowitz
recognizes that these kinds of factors might also account for variation
across counties, but he assumes that differing patterns of local
enforcement must otherwise result from localities' ability or inability
to bear the cost of expensive capital prosecutions.15
By focusing so heavily on resource differentials as the source of
arbitrariness in capital charging decisions across localities, Professor
Gershowitz misses what may be the most important benefit of
localism in criminal justice-namely, its tendency to make the
enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the values, priorities,
and felt needs of local communities. In our society, crime is not
conceived of solely as an offense against the sovereign itself. Even if
criminal cases are, formally speaking, prosecuted in the name of a
sovereign such as the "United States of America" or one of the several
states, crimes are also understood as offenses against the local
community in which they were committed.
The localism inherent in the American conception of crime is
reflected in myriad ways. At the state level, most law enforcement is
performed by local police agencies and funded, in large part, by local
governments-and, in virtually all states, criminal cases are
prosecuted locally, albeit in the name of the state. Interestingly
enough, localism is still the order of the day in the minority of states
with statewide enforcement of the criminal law. The three states in
which prosecutions are handled primarily at the state level-Alaska,
Delaware, and Rhode Island-have populations small enough that
14. See Smith, supra note 3, at 294 (citing opinion poll finding that "by a two-to-one margin,
Americans say the death penalty is not imposed enough rather than imposed too much").
15. See id. at 318-23 (stating that "even when considering varying crime rates and
legitimate differences of opinion as to which crimes are worthy of death, it is hard to explain the
wide variations in counties' use of the death penalty" except as resource-driven).
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statewide prosecutors necessarily "reflect local preferences," and
where it exists, statewide prosecution authority is exercised in
cooperation with local prosecutors and only "rarely used" to take over
cases. 16 In most states, prosecutors (and trial judges) are elected by
the people of each city or county-an effort to hold them directly
accountable to the local community.17 Even in the federal system, with
presidential appointment of U.S. Attorneys, the Senate confirmation
process ensures that prosecutors will be accountable to the local
communities they serve.18
Moreover, regardless of the manner in which prosecutors and
judges are selected, localism is guaranteed by constitutional law.
Barring valid grounds for changes of venue, criminal prosecutions
must occur in "the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed."19 In cases where the right to trial by jury applies,
the jury must be selected from a group of citizens that is fairly
representative of the diversity of the local community.20
16. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the
States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 562, 572 (2011). Professor Barkow's fascinating survey of state
practice leads her to the following conclusion: "In almost every state, a conscious choice has been
made to defer to local prosecutors. States have centralized authority in a statewide prosecutor in
a handful of areas ..... [b]ut outside these contexts, local prosecutors are responsible for the vast
bulk of criminal law enforcement within a state. And these local prosecutors are operating in
most states with little centralized supervision by a state-level actor." Id. at 545.
17. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 533 & n.117 (2001) (stating that more than ninety-five percent of local district attorneys are
elected); id. at 533-35 (contending that the accountability of elected prosecutors to voters gives
them incentives to produce litigation outcomes the public would favor).
18. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 789-90 (1999) (discussing how U.S. attorneys are
responsive to police and other local interests).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Though it might appear to be a technical venue requirement
only, the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement tells us something important about the
traditional American conception of crimes and the juries who adjudicate guilt or innocence.
Crimes are not merely offenses against crime victims or a distant sovereign; crimes are also
wrongs against the local communities where they were committed. Similarly, juries are not just
bodies of citizens designed to impose democratic checks on the power of state officials to impose
punishment, but representatives of the local communities aggrieved by the alleged conduct of the
accused. The intensely local nature of crimes and juries is a key reason for requiring that
prosecutions take place in the localities where the crimes occurred. For an exploration of the
common law and constitutional roots of the vicinage requirement, see Steven A. Engel, The
Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658, 1673-1704 (2000).
20. See. e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (ruling that the Sixth
Amendment requires that juries be drawn from a fair cross-section of the local community). Of
course, jury-selection practices may serve to undermine the degree to which the petit jury is truly
representative of the community. The removal of jurors for cause or through peremptory
challenges may cause juries to lose some degree of the representativeness they had at the venire
stage. Moreover, in capital cases, the controversial but accepted practice of "death qualifying"
juries has been shown to result in "hanging juries" that have fewer minorities and women and
are significantly more likely to convict and impose the death penalty than other juries. See
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The fact that localism is hardwired into longstanding American
notions of criminal justice has significant ramifications for Professor
Gershowitz's project. It shows that localism in criminal law has been
viewed, on the whole, as beneficial in our country-a feature that
promotes the sound operation of the criminal justice system by
keeping law enforcement accountable to the wishes and values of the
communities it serves. 21 This traditional view, of course, might be
wrong, but with localism as entrenched as it is in American criminal
practice, it cannot simply be assumed that localism (and the lack of
uniformity it permits) lacks redeeming virtues. The burden is on those
who would jettison localism in capital punishment to show that the
benefits of doing so outweigh the attendant costs.
At least at this juncture, that critical showing has not been
made. The only reason Professor Gershowitz gives for moving to state-
level enforcement is that localism, coupled with the high cost of
enforcing the death penalty, leads counties that would otherwise
pursue capital charges against deserving suspects to decline such
charges for cost reasons, resulting in arbitrary disparities in capital
charging decisions statewide. To be sure, he identifies several
advantages of a properly constructed system of statewide
enforcement-such as staffing capital cases with experienced, highly
skilled trial judges and lawyers and achieving cost savings by
reducing the high rate of reversible error in capital caseS22-but those
advantages are not, as he frames it, the reason for moving to statewide
enforcement. The reason is to "eliminat[e] the geographic
arbitrariness of the death penalty" that results from the inability of
most localities to bear the high cost of trying capital cases. 23
Smith, supra note 3, at 335 & n. 179 (citing studies finding that death-qualified juries are more
conviction-prone and more likely to impose death). Still, local representativeness is a central idea
behind the American conception of criminal juries.
21. See generally Richard Briffault, What About the "Ism"? Normative and Formal Concerns
in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) (identifying "increasing
opportunities for political participation, keeping government close to the people,
intergovernmental competition, [and] the representation of diverse interests" as core values of
localism).
22. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 344-58 (discussing advantages of "elite" statewide
enforcement of the death penalty). Professor Gershowitz specifically refers to these advantages
as "benefits" (as opposed to motivating aims) of his proposals. Id. at 344.
23. Id. at 311. The ultimate goal, he says, is for states "to make capital charging decisions
without regard to money" and, in doing so, to "equalize capital cases across the state." Id. at 359.
This, of course, responds directly to what the article identifies at the outset as the source of
'serious problems" in the death penalty: " [t]he uneven use of the death penalty across the nation"
(including the "troubling" phenomenon of "under-utilization of the death penalty in many
counties"). Id. at 309-10. If done in the manner Professor Gershowitz suggests, solving the
geographic arbitrariness problem might have the collateral benefit of making capital trials
fairer, more reliable, and more cost-effective. Those benefits, however, can be achieved through
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Although I agree with Professor Gershowitz that cost
undoubtedly plays a key role at the margin in capital charging
decisions,24 that hardly means that the death penalty is prohibitively
expensive for most localities to enforce. To the contrary, even smaller,
poorer localities have repeatedly shown a willingness, in appropriate
cases, to go to remarkable (and, at times, astonishing) lengths to
finance trials in which prosecutors insist on seeking the death penalty.
In one well-known recent example, Vinton County, Ohio
(population 13,000), agreed to fund a case in which the local
prosecutor wished to seek the death penalty. The county did so despite
the fact that, according to the president of the county board of
commissioners, a capital trial would wreak havoc on the county's
annual budget of $2.7 million. As he put it, "[i]f [the prosecutor and
grand jury] need the money, we'll find it."25 Only the trial judge's
extraordinary decision to invoke cost concerns as grounds for
precluding the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty prevented
the case from going forward as a capital case. Interestingly, although
he agreed with the judge that seeking the death penalty would have a
catastrophic effect on the county's budget, the board president decried
the judge's decision and supported allowing the prosecution to proceed
as a capital case.
There are other examples of small, cash-strapped localities
working to overcome resource constraints to finance death penalty
prosecutions. In 1998, Jasper County, Texas, agreed to fund an effort
to execute three white supremacists who dragged a black man to
death. The cost of the prosecution exceeded $1 million, fully ten
percent of the county's budget for that year, and the county had to
raise property taxes by almost seven percent for two years to pay for
the prosecution. 26 In another case, Quitman County, Mississippi, said
local enforcement, such as by increasing funding for indigent defense, issuing demanding
standards of effective representation, and providing local judges and lawyers rigorous training in
death penalty law and procedure. Only the desire to eliminate cost-driven geographic variation
and achieve statewide uniformity in capital charging decisions necessitates a move to statewide
enforcement.
24. See id. at 318-23. Some prosecutors in smaller localities report being pressured not to
bankrupt their counties by seeking the death penalty. For example, according to a recent news
report, prosecutors from smaller localities in Georgia who were considering filing capital charges
"had pressure, with people telling them, 'you're going to break us' [if you seek the death
penalty]." Stephen Gurr, The High Cost of Death, GAINESVILLE TIMES (Ga.), Oct. 5, 2008,
http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/archives/7755/.
25. Adam Liptak, Citing Cost, Judge Rejects the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002,
at A18.
26. See Russell Gold, Counties Struggle with High Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at B1 (providing examples of counties taking extreme measures to pay
for capital trials).
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to be the state's poorest county, raised taxes three times in several
years and took out loans to pay for a death penalty case that took
years to litigate. 27 In other jurisdictions, localities have responded to
the high cost of death penalty trials not just by raising taxes, but also
by slashing spending on police, fire, and rescue services, as well as by
delaying necessary capital projects and incurring debt. 2 8
Examples such as these, though admittedly anecdotal in
nature, refute the notion that the death penalty is prohibitively
expensive for most localities to enforce. What they show is that, in
cases deemed to be worth the sacrifices involved, even small counties
with severe resource constraints are willing and able to make the
tradeoffs necessary to ensure that appropriate cases go forward as
capital prosecutions. In other cases, where the sacrifices are not
viewed as worth the potential gains of achieving death sentences,
localities are insisting that their prosecutors utilize life imprisonment
or other suitably long prison sentences to protect the safety of the
community.
Even if wealthier counties would make different choices in
handling similarly situated offenders, this does not add up to
arbitrariness. Rather, local governments make precisely these sorts of
tradeoffs all the time in fiscal matters affecting the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens, including K-12 education, policing, public
works, and other beneficial public expenditures. It is a cardinal virtue
of localism that local communities get to make these choices for
themselves, in a manner that reflects the priorities, needs, and values
of their constituents. To say the least, it is hardly self-evident that, of
all the important matters that localities fund, capital cases alone
should be immunized from routine tradeoffs among competing fiscal
priorities. 29
27. Id.; see also Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions 5-6
(Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8382, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8382 (providing examples of counties taking drastic measures to
pay for capital cases).
28. See generally Baicker, supra note 27, at 5 ("One Texas county tried to raise taxes to pay
for a high-profile capital trial and the taxpayers revolted and voted for a tax rollback, which
forced the county commissioners to cut funding to fire and ambulance services in the county
. . . ."). According to Professor Baicker, over the fifteen-year period she studied, localities raised,
through tax hikes or spending cuts, $1.6 billion to fund death penalty prosecutions. Id. at 15; see
also RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., MILLIONS MISSPENT: WHAT POLITICIANS
DON'T SAY ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 4-7 (1994), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/599 (describing the cost of the death penalty to local
governments).
29. It is even less obvious why, in the state-level enforcement scheme Professor Gershowitz
advocates, localities should be required to help underwrite the costs of state death penalty trials.
Under present law, localities typically pay for capital trials, with some financial help at times
114
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III. SAVING FURMAN FROM ITSELF: A POSTSCRIPT ON THE
"POLITICS OF DEATH"T
Despite the disagreements noted thus far, it is hard for me to
be too critical of Professor Gershowitz's provocative reform proposals.
After all, his motivating goals-to promote greater rationality and less
unwarranted variation in capital charging and sentencing decisions-
are undeniably laudable. Ever since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court has sought to ensure that the death penalty will be reserved for
the "worst" or most deserving killings and rationally imposed
pursuant to uniform statewide legislative standards of "death
eligibility."30 In seeking to reduce the distorting influence of severe
resource constraints in capital cases-on, importantly, both the
prosecution and defense sideS31-his proposal seeks to promote the
Furman regime's stated goal of rationalizing the imposition of the
death penalty by ensuring that individual desert will determine who is
sentenced to death.
In a way, Professor Gershowitz seeks to save the Furman
regime from itself-and, judging from the current state of the death
penalty, it needs all the help it can get. His account suggests that
Furman sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Although Furman
sought to achieve a rational and fairly administered death penalty, he
argues that this goal cannot be achieved because death sentences are
from states, but localities also have the power to decide, in conjunction with local prosecutors,
whether or not to incur the resulting high costs. Professor Gershowitz, however, would take from
localities the power to make the critical decision over whether to seek the death penalty but
allow states to force them to contribute to the cost of capital trials that state officials decide to
pursue. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 353-54. If enforcing the death penalty truly is to be
treated as a state function from start to finish, as he urges, with states making capital charging
decisions and prosecuting capital cases through state personnel, then funding the resulting
capital trials should be entirely the responsibility of the states. When localities perform the
state's function of enforcing the death penalty, it is proper for states to choose to compensate
them for it. In Professor Gershowitz's enforcement scheme, however, states are enforcing the
death penalty for themselves, not for localities, and doing so through state personnel and state
enforcement mechanisms.
30. See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 361-71 (describing the goals of Furman
and other Eighth Amendment cases).
31. Professor Gershowitz is to be commended (ideally not just in a footnote) for his
admirable evenhandedness on resource constraints in capital cases. Many who complain of the
high cost of the death penalty are concerned only with reducing the costs incurred by the defense.
These critics are perfectly willing to allow prosecutors and police to spend whatever they believe
to be necessary to obtain death sentences; it is only costs incurred in the defense of capital
charges that they deem to be wasteful. To his great credit, Professor Gershowitz recognizes that
defense attorneys, no less than prosecutors, should be freed from resource constraints that
prevent them from performing their important role in the proper functioning of the adversarial
system of justice. Thus, his goal is not just a cheaper death penalty, but a fairer death penalty.
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so expensive to obtain.32 Of course, it is the Furman regime itself, and
more generally the Supreme Court's "death is different," "super due
process" approach to capital punishment, that has made the death
penalty so expensive to enforce. Seen in this light, Statewide Capital
Punishment, although not framed in these terms, is part of a larger
literature that treats current shortcomings in the administration of
the death penalty as unintended consequences of the Supreme Court's
reform efforts.33
The question is how best to rehabilitate the Furman regime.
Critics of capital punishment argue that the game is not worth the
candle-the death penalty can never be fairly administered, and
judicial efforts to improve it, no matter how well intentioned, tend
only to make matters worse. 34 Some argue for "mend it, don't end it"
approaches, such as using constitutional law strategically to
counteract leading sources of arbitrariness in capital punishment
while allowing legislatures continued latitude to utilize the death
penalty.35 Professor Gershowitz takes the latter course in Statewide
Capital Punishment, in keeping with his prior work in this area. 36
Some aspects of Professor Gershowitz's reform proposals would
indeed make the death penalty fairer-and they would do so precisely
because they would counteract key ingredients of the politics of death.
The politics of death gives the actors with institutional roles in
the enforcement of the death penalty-legislators, governors,
prosecutors, and judges-incentives to perform their functions in ways
that make death sentences easier to obtain and more impervious to
32. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 319-23.
33. See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 371-403 (arguing that Furman not
only failed to achieve its stated objectives, but has entrenched the death penalty in American
criminal practice by giving the false impression that constitutional law limits capital punishment
to truly deserving cases); Smith, supra note 3, at 286-336 (arguing that Furman unleashed the
politics of death and caused the political branches to make the death penalty easier to impose
and harder to defend against).
34. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 357-60 (arguing that, despite the Supreme
Court's efforts to reform the death penalty, capital punishment remains as arbitrary as before
and that judicial regulation has only served to legitimize and entrench the death penalty).
35. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 346-80 (contending that a more demanding
constitutional standard of effective assistance of counsel can be used to counteract legislative
underfunding of indigent defense in capital cases).
36. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Get in the Game or Get out of the Way: Fixing the Politics of
Death, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51 (2008); Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capital
Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REV. 73 (2007); Adam M. Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why
Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861
(2007); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 J.L. & POL.
669 (2001).
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attack. 37 They have acted on these incentives in a variety of ways.
Legislatures have expanded the scope of the death penalty, severely
underfunded indigent defense, and restricted access to the courts.
Prosecutors, eager to convince voters that they are "tough" on crime
but forced by the high cost of capital trials to limit their use of the
death penalty, push (and all too often cross) the line separating
zealous from overzealous advocacy in capital prosecutions.
Particularly in cases involving killings that are covered extensively in
local media, state judges who must stand for reelection have upheld
death sentences even in the face of errors that were clear enough
eventually to result in federal habeas relief. Governors, who prior to
Furman liberally granted clemency to death-row inmates, rarely do so
today except in cases with strong innocence claims, defeating the role
of clemency as a viable avenue for relief when the judicial process
produces unjust results.
To the extent legislatures accept Professor Gershowitz's
suggestions wholesale-by providing well-trained judges and ethically
responsible prosecutors insulated from the pull of politics, and by
adequately funding indigent defense-the death penalty would indeed
be more fairly administered than it presently is. Here, though, lies the
rub. These measures would improve the death penalty by
counteracting the politics of death. Nevertheless, it is the politics of
death that would cause states not to enact those measures in the first
place.
After all, Professor Gershowitz's scheme would only make it
harder for prosecutors to obtain death sentences. In case after case, it
has become clear that the zealous, competent defense representation
that he rightly seeks to achieve can only lead to juries being presented
with stronger grounds for leniency, even for defendants who
committed gruesome killings. 38 This, to say the least, is not what
37. See generally Smith, supra note 3, at 294-336 (explaining the politics of death by
exploring how institutional incentives affect political behavior regarding the death penalty).
38. See generally id. at 353-370 (discussing cases in which errors by defense attorneys
likely skewed the life/death balance capital jurors struck). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000), is a striking example. There, a Virginia jury had little trouble imposing the death penalty
on a defendant whose appointed lawyer was incompetent at the sentencing phase. The lawyer
made no effort to discover and present grounds for leniency and thus missed evidence that his
client was borderline mentally retarded and had endured what the Supreme Court described as
a "nightmarish childhood" of severe abuse and neglect. Id. at 372 n.4, 395. Faced with the
prospect on remand of encountering a mitigation case, the prosecutor threw in the towel and
agreed to accept a life sentence instead of death. See Frank Green, Death Row Veteran's Life
Spared, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Nov. 15, 2000, at Al. Sadly, cases of poor defense
representation in capital cases are all too common nationwide. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.
1835, 1836 (1994) ("It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal representation, that
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legislators want-which is why they so severely constrain the funding
of indigent defense representation and, comparatively speaking, so
lavishly fund the prosecution side of the case. 39
Presumably in recognition of the considerable political
obstacles facing passage of the fairness-promoting aspects of his
proposal, Professor Gershowitz has little choice but to pitch them as
cost-saving measures. Better defense representation, more competent
trial judges, and more ethical prosecutors, he claims, will pay for
themselves over time in the form of averted reversals and retrials.40 It
would be wonderful news if in fact this were the case, but I am
skeptical that the overall result of a fairer process would be to reduce
the cost of enforcing the death penalty-as, I expect, legislatures will
be as well.
The resources available to indigent representation should be
increased, not because doing so will save money, but because it is the
right thing to do in a system that prides itself on affording due process
and equal justice under law. If these lofty constitutional imperatives
do not move legislatures to enact reforms that would promote the
integrity and reliability of the capital sentencing process, it is highly
doubtful that the remote chance of cost savings will.4 1
[determines whether] the death penalty [is] imposed .... ); Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 323-26
(discussing incompetent and underfunded capital defense attorneys).
39. See Smith, supra note 3, at 302-07 (discussing how legislators facilitate the death
penalty by strategically allocating funds to favor prosecutors). Professor Gershowitz assumes
that underfunding of indigent defense is the result of local enforcement of the criminal law. See
Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 325-26 (stating that "many of the nation's counties continue to lack
sufficient funds to provide an adequate defense for capital and non-capital defendants"). This
assumption is mistaken. The cause of severe constraints on indigent defense is not lack of
resources but rather lack of political desire to provide a fair defense for indigent defendants.
Bluntly put, legislatures want to underfund indigent defense relative to prosecution because
doing so makes it considerably easier for prosecutors-their natural allies-to obtain convictions
and, in capital cases, death sentences. See Smith, supra note 3, at 302-07 (discussing legislative
underfunding of criminal defense). As one commenter notes: "[T]he state and federal
governments together allocate over half of their criminal justice spending to the investigation
and prosecution of crimes but only about two percent to indigent defense." Kyung M. Lee,
Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent Defendants, and the Right to
Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 373 (2004) (citing Justice Department data). The problem, then,
is even deeper than Professor Gershowitz supposes: at all levels-local, state, and federal-
funding is skewed, and heavily and intentionally so, in favor of the prosecution and law
enforcement, to the detriment of indigent defendants and the lawyers who struggle to defend
them in the face of such daunting obstacles.
40. Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 346-53.
41. Recent experience with federal habeas corpus reform provides support for this
admittedly grim assessment. In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & Supp. 2009), Congress allowed states to opt into a scheme of streamlined
habeas corpus review by enacting a number of reforms designed to bolster the reliability of death
sentences. See id. §§ 2261, 2263, 2266. These reforms included allocating more funding for
indigent defense, addressing the problem of ineffective representation in capital cases, and
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To the extent legislatures take any interest in Professor
Gershowitz's proposals, they would most likely enact those that would
ease the prosecution's path to death sentences and pass on those that
would help the defense. This could most easily be done by having the
state underwrite the cost of prosecuting (but not defending) capital
cases. 42 By holding current inadequate levels of defense funding
constant and infusing new funds into the prosecution of capital cases,
states would substantially ease the cost to localities of seeking the
death penalty and exacerbate the already wide gap in funding
available to prosecution and defense.
This partial displacement of localism in the death penalty
would address the central arbitrariness that worries Professor
Gershowitz-namely, cost-driven geographic disparities in capital
charging decisions. Importantly, however, it would worsen the
administration of the death penalty by making it even easier for
"resource-constrained capital defenders [to] get steamrolled by
prosecutors determined to win even at great cost." 4 3 This is not the
result Professor Gershowitz advocates, of course, but it is, I fear, the
most likely outcome of deviating from the tradition of localism in
enforcement of the death penalty.
This outcome would not save Furman from itself but rather
turn Furman on its head. The limited success that Furman has had in
reining in the death penalty depends critically on local enforcement.
providing death-row inmates a right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Id. § 2261.
Although these reforms would have dramatically reduced the expense and delays of federal
habeas corpus proceedings in state capital cases, no state has opted into the streamlined review
process. See Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, Note, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"): Understanding the Failures of State Opt-In Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969,
1981-96 (2007) (discussing state failures to satisfy the standards necessary for streamlined
treatment under the AEDPA). Evidently, regardless of the potential gains of reducing costs and
delays in the enforcement of the death penalty, states were simply unwilling to take meaningful
steps to improve the poor quality of representation that indigent defendants typically receive in
capital cases.
42. In fact, in a number of cases where localities claimed they could not pursue capital
charges without state financial assistance, states have supplied the necessary funding. See Gold,
supra note 26, at Bl. Furthermore, state attorneys general routinely come to the aid of local
prosecutors in need of assistance in criminal cases. See Barkow, supra note 16, at 560
(discussing, among other forms of state assistance to local prosecutors, investigative help,
forensic support, financial assistance, and lobbying).
43. Smith, supra note 3, at 286. Of course, widening the resource gap between prosecution
and defense is hardly the only way that states could undermine Professor Gershowitz's scheme.
For example, in place of the fair-minded and apolitical prosecutors he advocates, states could put
the statewide enforcement mechanism in the hands of the prosecutors who have been the most
aggressive in enforcing the death penalty. These prosecutors not only would find the prospect of
a career devoted to capital cases to be especially rewarding, but would be least likely to exercise
discretion fairly and wisely (particularly without the discipline of external funding constraints),
and most likely to pursue death sentences overzealously.
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The death penalty has not been limited in the manner that Furman
anticipated-by having juries, presented with full information about
potential mitigating circumstances, apply meaningful standards of
death eligibility in truly adversarial sentencing hearings. In this
respect, the Furman regime has been an abject failure44 -and will
remain so unless the Supreme Court shifts regulatory strategies and
addresses the politics of death that have worked so effectively in
Furman's wake to undermine the Court's regulatory goals.45
The Furman regime has succeeded only in the limited sense
that it has made capital prosecutions so expensive that localities have
strong financial incentives, at the margin, to exercise restraint in the
use of the death penalty. The results speak for themselves. As one
study of local enforcement of the death penalty over almost two
decades has found, "most counties (more than 80 percent) had no
death penalty convictions and more than 10 percent had exactly 1 year
with a death penalty conviction between 1983 and 1997."46 Thus,
while states have rushed to expand the death penalty and make it
easier to impose since Furman,4 7 the localities that actually bear the
cost of funding capital trials have shown remarkable restraint in the
use of the ultimate sanction.
Here lies the danger of deviating, in whole or in part, from
localism in the death penalty. If states take over the enforcement of
the death penalty, as Professor Gershowitz urges, or underwrite the
cost of local prosecution of capital cases, prosecutors will have less
incentive to show the remarkable restraint that localities have shown
in the "states authorize, but localities subsidize" approach to capital
punishment. Given the greater resources that are available to states,
states are better positioned than localities to bear the financial costs of
seeking the death penalty. Consequently, deviations from localism in
capital punishment will most likely result in more death sentences
and more executions-and, importantly, the increased use of the death
penalty would take place under the failed Furman regime that has
44. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 7, at 360 ("[T]he Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, originally promoted by self-consciously abolitionist litigators and advanced by
reformist members of the Court, not only has failed to meet its purported goal of rationalizing
the imposition of the death penalty, but also may have helped to stabilize and entrench the
practice of capital punishment in the United States").
45. See Smith, supra note 3, at 294-95 (explaining how the politics of death unleashed after
Furman u. Georgia resulted in a death penalty that is easier to obtain and more frequently
imposed and carried out).
46. Baicker, supra note 27, at 9.
47. See generally Smith, supra note 3, at 295-307 (discussing how the political incentives
derived from the death penalty's visibility and popularity have driven legislative efforts to
facilitate capital punishment since Furman).
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done so little to improve the administration of capital punishment.
This would solve the geographic arbitrariness that troubles Professor
Gershowitz, but at a very high price indeed.
